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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the institutional arrangements that develop when the risks of opportunism and 
other contributors to transaction costs are high but transactions are nevertheless necessary for 
economic efficiency.  Williamson’s famous distinction between markets and hierarchies is inadequate 
because under certain circumstances markets may be hierarchies that are deliberately managed to 
reduce levels of transaction costs and undertake strategic objectives to improve their competitiveness 
with other hierarchies, including other markets.  As transaction costs are production costs for these 
markets, careful management increases the efficiency of the markets. As a result, some important 
markets are also hierarchies that are structured in ways that are analogous to firms precisely in order 
to reduce their costs of operation, including the transaction costs that arise from using them. 
This paper looks at the evolution of the membership rules of stock exchanges, a select but important 
group of markets that have been consciously constructed over long periods and with frequent 
modifications because of environmental change and learning by participants.  Stock exchanges belong 
to a category that also includes insurance exchanges such as Lloyd’s, and various markets involving 
shipping and world trade.  These are markets in which the use of up-to-date information is especially 
important because conditions may alter quickly and in which risk, uncertainty, and the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour are factors that affect their operations in significant ways.  Their productivity 
as markets is (or historically has been) so high that their replacement by hierarchies is virtually 
unthinkable because they allow for exchanges that could not otherwise be accomplished smoothly.  
As a result, when transaction and agency costs arise in such markets, responses have concentrated on 
finding mechanisms for reducing them to tolerable levels rather than on abandoning transactions 
altogether through the internalization of activities. 
The early sections of the paper are devoted to an examination of the logic of constructed markets, 
while the later sections examine how this logic worked out in the case of the London, New York and 
Sydney Stock Exchanges in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Introduction 
 
The boundaries of firms and markets are inextricably related. The exact location of the 
boundaries of firms, that delineate the activities undertaken internally, are often attributed to 
“market failure” – to inefficiencies and other “frictions” that make markets expensive to use 
and therefore induce firms to produce goods and services internally that they might otherwise 
purchase in markets.  In this formulation, markets are actually given the starring role even 
though attention usually focuses on firms because economists tend to view market 
transactions as more natural in some sense than the internalization of activities that might 
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otherwise be purchased.  In his seminal 1937 article on transaction costs, Ronald Coase offers 
a quotation from Sir Arthur Salter as a typical economist’s view of the way in which market 
economies function (Coase, 1937; 387 ):1 
The normal economic system works itself.  For its current operation it is under no 
central control, it needs no central survey.  Over the whole range of human activity 
and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption by a 
process that is automatic, elastic and responsive. 
In other words, the price system operating through markets provides all of the coordination 
necessary for an economy to operate as near to optimally as makes no practical difference.  
While firms may benefit through narrow specialization in a Smithian sense, they are unlikely 
to benefit from vertical integration as long as markets are frictionless (that is, costless to use).  
Moreover, adding activities may be increase production costs since it is hard to be a master of 
all trades.  To explain the contrast between this picture of simplicity and the real-world 
existence of vertically-integrated firms with complicated organizational structures, modern 
economists generally invoke the presence of transaction costs to demonstrate how market 
failure may drive firms to broaden their scope of activities. 
The converse of the argument is that the presence of markets with relatively low transaction 
costs will discourage vertical integration.  Furthermore, the extent of vertical integration can 
be expected to vary as transaction costs rise and fall (Langlois, 1992).  Therefore, at least in 
this formulation, both the boundaries of firms (the range of activities that they undertake) and 
the boundaries of markets (the range of activities undertaken and the cast of players) are 
primarily determined by the costs of using markets rather than by the productive efficiency of 
firms. 
                                                 
1
 Coase (1993a [1988]) also mentions Salter’s passage in his fiftieth anniversary account of the origins of his 
article. 
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But this is far from the whole story because markets are far from uniform.  In fact, modern 
“market economies” embrace a wide range of institutions for exchanging ownership of goods 
and services.  The types of transactions undertaken are not only varied, but some important 
markets are also hierarchies that are structured in ways that are analogous to firms precisely 
in order to reduce their costs of operation, including the transaction costs that arise from 
using them. 
In this paper, I look at the evolution of a select but important group of markets that have been 
consciously constructed, albeit over long periods and with frequent modifications because of 
environmental change and learning by participants.  These include stock exchanges, 
insurance exchanges such as Lloyd’s, and various markets involving shipping and world 
trade, markets in which the use of up-to-date information is especially important because 
conditions may alter quickly and in which risk, uncertainty, and the potential for 
opportunistic behavior are factors that affect their operations in significant ways.  Their 
productivity as markets is (or historically has been) so high that their replacement by 
hierarchies is virtually unthinkable because they allow for exchanges that could not otherwise 
be accomplished smoothly.  As a result, when transaction and agency costs arise in such 
markets, responses have concentrated on finding mechanisms for reducing them to tolerable 
levels rather than on abandoning transactions altogether through the internalization of 
activities. 
In the first section, I try to define what a market is, a problem that turns out to be surprisingly 
elusive.  The second section investigates the sorts of factors that may affect the smooth 
operations of the types of markets under consideration by examining both production costs 
and transactions costs of various types.  In the third section, the analysis is applied to the 
development of stock exchanges in English-speaking countries since the seventeenth century 
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to demonstrate how they have been constructed with relatively confined boundaries in order 
to restrict transaction and agency costs, improve their internal efficiency, and provide ways of 
coping with inherent uncertainty as well as risk. The concluding section applies some 
observations made in the earlier discussion to broader questions concerning transaction costs 
and the boundaries of firms and markets. 
1.  Markets and The Market 
 
Although “markets” lie at the core of modern economies as well as underpinning neoclassical 
economic theory, in practice they have such a wide range of characteristics that, to use a 
biological analogy, in their level of diversity they are closer to a genus, or even a family or an 
order, than to a species.   
In its most general sense, a market (or The Market) is an ideal type, a consciously chosen 
selection of characteristics that have been logically configured by economists to examine how 
the price system functions.2  Although perfectly competitive markets lie at the heart of the 
analysis, variations based on more limited forms of competition (monopoly, duopoly, 
oligopoly, etc.) have also been dissected and evaluated by economists.  The importance of 
The Market is not its realism since it is doubtful if perfect competition has often prevailed in 
the real world, but that the analysis provides a series of benchmarks against which the 
performance of other market structures may be judged.  For example, Caves (1964; 15) 
contends that “Market structure is important because it determines the behavior of firms in 
the industry, and that behavior in turn determines the quality of the industry’s performance.”  
On examination, this leads to the conclusion that highly competitive markets with high levels 
of performance are superior, a deduction that Caves (1992; 15) defines as “our normative 
                                                 
2
 Economists are, of course, not the only people who have been concerned with defining markets.  Max Weber, 
for instance, gave considerable attention to the issue, in the end deciding that markets have “an amorphous 
structure” (quoted in Swedberg (2000), p. 379).  
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appraisal of the social quality of the allocation of resources that results from a market’s 
conduct”.  As I discuss below, this analysis of The Market has contributed not only to a 
preference for high levels of competition, but also to the standards of behavior and 
performance that groups have tried to generate when constructing markets in order to reduce 
market failure. 
This approach to markets has tended to squash consideration of markets and their alternatives 
in some areas where we might expect a strict and workable definition of markets to be 
essential.  In a survey of microeconomics textbooks, for example, I found that markets are 
often not defined at all or, if they are, that the definitions provide little for students to ponder.  
In this, they are following Williamson (1975, 20) in contending that “in the beginning there 
were markets”.  While Williamson notes that he is taking this position for “for expositional 
convenience”, however, some other authors do not seem to recognize that there is an issue at 
stake.  Expositional convenience may well justify some cutting of corners, and it is clear that 
in many areas in modern capitalist economies the existence of markets is so common as to 
virtually undebatable, but recent events in China, Eastern Europe, and parts of the former 
Soviet Union have demonstrated that the preconditions for the efficient operation of markets 
are not universally available and that conscious intervention may be necessary to build a 
market economy.  Laws securing property rights, for example, are constructs and by no 
means “natural” in the minds of people in many societies.  (North, 2005; Greif, 2006)   
Popular dictionaries of economics are not much better at capturing the meaning of “market”.3  
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics (Black, 2002; 288) offers as a first definition that a 
market is “A place or institution in which buyers and sellers of a good or asset meet.”  It 
asserts that “Markets facilitate trade in goods…;  in securities…; in labour services…; or in 
                                                 
3
 For a thought-provoking and controversial discussion of the meaning of “market” and “marketplace” from a 
sociological standpoint, see Callon (1998) . 
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foreign exchange…”, but does not discuss how this facilitation occurs.  The second definition 
in the Oxford Dictionary refers to a market economy and in essence echoes the views of 
Caves on the benefits flowing from high degrees of competition.  This definition notes that 
“An efficient market is one where prices reflect all available information about the good or 
asset concerned (289)” and lists a number of causes of market failure, but gives no indication 
of how market failure might be avoided and efficiency achieved.  The Collins Dictionary of 
Economics (Pass et al., 2005; 324) says that a market is “An exchange mechanism that brings 
together buyers and sellers of a PRODUCT, FACTOR OF PRODUCTION or FINANCIAL SECURITY (see 
TRANSACTION).”   The definition notes a number of characteristics of markets and describes 
various types of competition, but (like the Oxford Dictionary) does not discuss how markets 
might operate in practice to achieve efficiency and high levels of competition. 
The correct conclusion to be drawn from these definitions, which is not mentioned explicitly 
in any of the accounts, is that markets are by no means homogeneous entities, a point that 
Geroski (1998) also makes, although from a somewhat different angle.  Geroski contends that 
markets are defined with three aims in mind.  The first is to identify the characteristics 
necessary for an institution of exchange in which the law of one price prevails, what he terms 
“trading markets”.  A second set of definitions addresses anti-trust concerns.  Finally, he 
concentrates on a third set of definitions, for “strategic markets”.  These are essentially the 
groups of actual or potential customers that a firm targets when trying to sell a particular 
product. 
This wide range of definitions does not undermine neo-classical analysis on the advantages of 
competition and market efficiency, but it does lead to a distinctly fuzzy picture of what goes 
on in a market economy.  The most obvious consequence is in the area of competition policy 
because fuzziness seems to imply that, depending on circumstances, a number of types of 
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markets might achieve acceptable levels of social welfare.  Similarly, by not specifying what 
happens in a market beyond the basic statement that it is a place in which buyers and sellers 
exchange assets, such vague definitions beg the question of what sorts of self-regulation and 
other aspects of constructing and limiting the operations of markets might be considered to be 
appropriate. 
Although economists may refer to The Market and the market economy, in practice there is a 
huge number of markets in a developed economy. Many of these markets do not have a 
distinct institutional or physical presence:  Lemonade can be bought at a supermarket, a 
restaurant, or from a child sitting in front of her house.  Nor is it necessarily true that a 
homogeneous product will be sold in a distinct market:  The same airline ticket may be 
purchased from the airline, a travel agent, or online as part of a package tour.  Does this 
imply that, as Geroski (1998) believes, a market’s boundaries are not inherent in the market 
itself but a subjective construct that can be varied as circumstances – and, more importantly, 
perceptions of circumstances – evolve?   Is it even meaningful to speak of markets in such 
miscellaneous circumstances? 
In contending that market boundaries are “something which we use to classify [the 
organization of economic activity] in our minds”, Geroski (1998, 689) may be somewhat 
insouciant4 because he is trading on the linguistic confusion caused by the ambiguity of the 
word “market” in English.  If one type of exchange activity or institution were termed X, 
another Y, and so on throughout the alphabet, much of the looseness surrounding the nature 
of “markets” would disappear.  For example, setting the boundaries of trading markets, in 
which the law of one price is an important objective, may not be subject to a wide range of 
arbitrary considerations.  Such markets may instead be highly focused specialized institutions 
                                                 
4
 As support, Geroski (1998) quotes Buzzell (1978, 3): “there is no single correct way to define the market for a 
given business unit . . . a market not only can but should be defined in several different ways.”  
 9 
which are sharply defined in terms of both their physical location (or locus of control and 
self-regulation) and the nearly homogeneous nature of goods traded.  This sharpness of focus 
does, in fact, occur reasonably often, as a result of which there are markets for particular 
classes of good and services such as securities, marine insurance, and a wide variety of 
commodities.  Some of these markets are centuries old, but others (markets for derivatives, 
for example) are of more recent origin.  Moreover, the category has a realistic chance of 
growing in the future because various e-markets have many similar characteristics even 
though their operations are as geographically diffuse as conditions allow. 
The distinguishing feature of these markets is not that they are specialized in terms of the 
items traded (because of strategic considerations of the type discussed by Geroski, some sell 
more than one type of product5), but that their operation is restricted to people who are 
willing to subscribe to a formal set of rules.  In general, as is discussed in more detail in the 
next section, rules are needed to restrict transaction costs in cases in which internalization is 
not a plausible alternative to operating through a market.  Lloyd’s, for example, describers 
itself as “the world’s leading insurance market providing specialist insurance services” 
(Lloyd’s, 2006).  It was established to spread risk widely by issuing policies backed by large 
pools (syndicates) of people (Names) with funds to invest.  Since the backers have to be 
reliable and fraud needs to be kept within tight limits to allow a reasonable prospect of 
profitability from the sale of marine and other types of insurance, the insurers try to block 
potential opportunism by vetting Names before they are allowed to invest, just as it assesses 
the risks facing shipowners and others who want to buy policies.  While internalization in the 
form of self-insurance would be a possible alternative for potential policy holders who are 
worried about being cheated when they make legitimate claims, many people or firms would 
find the risk excessive.  As a result, they are willing to pay slightly more in order to do 
                                                 
5
 See, for instance, the discussion of changes in the range of goods traded in various U.S. futures exchanges in 
Carlton (1984). 
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business with insurers who operate in a formally demarcated and self-regulated market.  
Equally importantly, the closed nature of Lloyd’s protects the investors from serious risk of 
default on the part of other Names in their syndicates. 
In effect, this category comprises markets that have been constructed quite consciously to 
provide the benefits that economists have dictated should exist in The Market but which are 
frequently missing from markets in the everyday world.6   In practice, markets do not have to 
offer free access to all comers to be highly competitive.  All that is required is a sufficient 
number of participants to allow prices to be set efficiently through competitive bidding.  The 
main focus of the regulations that these markets have laid down and enforced has been on the 
frictions that are now termed transaction costs.  In the process, these regulations have 
generated other kinds of transaction costs, but these are of a type that is often overlooked – 
barriers that enabled markets to function more smoothly than they would have if unregulated.  
The upshot has been that the “production costs” involved in using these markets (that is, in 
gaining the benefits that flow from making exchanges in markets rather than through other 
types of trading arrangements) have in general been reduced by managing transaction costs in 
a systematic way. 
2.  Why Construct Markets? 
The factors that potentially influence the design of constructed markets depend on the 
institutional and physical environment in which each market operates and on the nature of the 
goods or services being traded.  They can be divided into the traditional categories of 
production and transaction costs and, following Langlois (forthcoming), transaction costs can 
be further subdivided into fixed costs, costs that are a function of time, and costs that are a 
                                                 
6
 This is not to imply that the people who established and later fine tuned the operations of specialized models 
consciously used economic theory as a guide, especially since a number of the markets were founded before 
economists had codified the benefits of high levels of competition.  As practitioners, however, the leaders or 
managers of these markets were aware of their practical needs as traders, needs that were eventually codified by 
generations of microeconomists.   
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function of the number of exchanges or volume of trade undertaken (Figure 1).  My argument 
is that, for constructed markets, many of the costs that are generally designated as transaction 
costs are actually production costs and that, far from being frictions, they contribute 
substantially to the efficiency of the markets in question.  
 
Fixed Costs 
 
Costs that are  
Function of Time 
 
Costs that are a function of 
the number of exchanges or 
volume of trade 
 
 
Examples: 
 
Legal, organization, and 
technological standards; 
hostages and bonds; locks, 
closed circuit TV 
 
Examples: 
 
Salaries of police, 
supervisors and other 
monitors; monthly protection 
money; maintenance of fixed 
investments 
 
Examples: 
 
Brokerage fees, 
commissions; insurance 
premia; queuing at the bank, 
ATM fees; inspection and 
regulatory fees; per-
transaction bribe 
 
 
Costs of Protecting Property 
Rights 
 
Costs of Protecting Property 
Rights 
 
Neoclassical Transaction 
Costs 
 
 
Source:  Based on Langlois (forthcoming), Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Types of (Transaction) Costs 
 
Carlton (1984) contends that futures markets should be analyzed as if they were firms 
because they compete strategically with other markets.  This is certainly true of many types 
of constructed markets, but the analogy with firms can be taken further to include the way in 
which they conduct their day-to-day operations.  Another significant advantage that 
conscious structuring confers on markets is that it allows all types of operating costs to be 
managed.  This does not mean that the costs can be eliminated but that, under favorable 
circumstances, they may be reduced in various ways that conduce to greater efficiency in the 
operations of the markets.  In Williamson’s famous dichotomy (1975, 1985), exchanges may 
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be dealt with through either markets or hierarchies.  Other intermediate forms have since 
been promoted including strategic ventures and other forms of cooperation (Thompson, et al., 
1991).  Coase (1960) has suggested (although hardly endorsed) the proposition that 
government regulation could be used to reduce transaction costs.  The alternative discussed in 
this paper is the self-regulation of markets that are, in most cases, owned and managed by 
their participants.  Because they are deliberately limited both in their functions and in the 
number and characteristics of their players, constructed markets have an ability to shape their 
environments and outcomes that is not open to markets as traditionally conceived. 
As Coase (1993b [1988]) has emphasized, neither production costs nor transaction costs 
should be analyzed in isolation because it is their sum that provides the basis for deciding 
whether to use markets, hierarchies, or other organizational forms.   The main purpose of a 
firm is to run a business – to produce goods or services for sale at a profit (Coase, 1993b 
[1988]); Langlois and Robertson, 1995).  Similarly, the main purpose of a market is to allow 
transactions to be undertaken.  Thus markets should be thought of as also having production 
costs unless one assumes that transactions somehow occur through some supernatural 
mechanism that does not require human effort or other inputs.  In common with firms, 
markets may face a variety of costs, not all of which can be outsourced.  For instance, a 
market may need a venue or marketplace (essentially the first definition of a market offered 
up in the Oxford Dictionary of Economics (2002)).  In some cases, this cost may be borne in a 
decentralized fashion, as when the market for new automobiles is spread around a number of 
individually-owned dealerships.  In others, the cost can be shoved off onto others, as in the 
case of the “curbside exchange” that, before it evolved into the American Stock Exchange, 
met in the streets of New York.  Likewise, the personnel needed to maintain a market may be 
deployed and paid for in a decentralized manner, or they may be employees of the market, or 
both.  Finally, markets may need an initial fund of capital to get them started and keep them 
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operating smoothly.  This capital could be subscribed by participants in the market and 
administered centrally, or it might be supplied and administered by individual participants 
who, in effect, barter their money and services to provide a lubricant for part of a market’s 
operations in return for similar services provided by other participants.  The choice of a 
structure to administer and distribute the costs of production differs from market to market 
depending on a host of factors such as the number of participants.  Neither very large nor 
very small numbers, for example, could be expected to maintain distinct premises.  
Constructed markets can adopt rules and procedures that allow them to undertake these tasks 
efficiently while still maintaining their essential function of facilitating transactions. 
A second possible reason for the construction of markets is the reduction in transaction costs 
that may derive from specialization.  By trading in markets with limited scope, the types of 
efficiencies that Smith (1937 [1776]) noted in the early chapters of The Wealth of Nations 
may become available: Greater mental and physical adeptness, greater innovativeness, and 
better use of time.  Because of their technical nature and significant reliance on up-to-date 
information, specialization can certainly improve the efficiency of many of these market, but 
the matter is not straight-forward.  As a result, the scope of markets that are seemingly 
dealing in the same goods may differ substantially.  In part, this is because of economies of 
scope since hard-to-acquire technical knowledge that is relevant to one field may also apply 
to others, encouraging people with rare skills to diversify their activities if they have spare 
resources (Penrose, 1959).7  In other words, the division of labor is limited by the extent of 
the market.  But there may be more involved as there is no reason to think that there is always 
a complete correspondence between the division of labor among markets and the degree of 
specialization of the people who use those markets.  A market that is substantial enough to be 
                                                 
7
 Near the end of the seventeenth century, for instance, the City of London licensed “brokers” but did not 
stipulate what products each was to deal in (Morgan and Thomas, 1962). 
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highly specialized in terms of the products traded may nevertheless absorb only a fraction of 
the time of the buyers and sellers who participate.  As I show below, for instance, in their 
early days stock exchanges often handled only a portion of the activities of many of their 
members, who were as a result obliged to “saunter” in the course of their work.  Thus it is 
reasonable to expect that the costs of sauntering would be balanced against the advantages 
that arise from market specialization.8   
An additional justification for limiting numbers, one that economists are guaranteed to 
mention, is that structured and regulated markets may be used to drive up profits by curtailing 
competition.  This obviously is a possibility in the specialized markets under discussion here, 
but there are limits to how severely competition can be limited when the purpose of the 
market is to generate conditions that approximate those of The Market.  If an efficient market 
is one in which all participants have access to prices that convey “all available information 
about the good or asset concerned” (Black, 2002, 289; Bernstein, 1992; Lo, 1997), then there 
must be enough buyers and sellers to insure that the prices are determined through a process 
involving a fairly high degree of competition.  On the other hand, bounded rationality must 
be restricted as far as possible because all participants need to be fully up-to-date on prices 
and the underlying information that they reflect.  In practice, this may place limits on how 
large the markets can be.  If it is not overdone, therefore, limiting the size of markets can 
increase their efficiency.  The prospect of competition is reinforced by the possible existence 
of other markets whose members trade in the same class of assets (Carlton, 1984).  In a 
number of cases, as in insurance and securities, multiple markets have been in competition, 
offering lower charges or additional services to attract customers. 
                                                 
8
 A lack of correspondence in the degrees of specialization and integration of different factors of production  
may affect the division of labor in other respects.  For example, over the past two centuries the integrative 
capacity of machinery to perform many tasks has had serious effects on the scope of activities of individual 
workers (Ames and Rosenberg, 1965; Robertson and Alston, 1992).  As technologies for integrating markets are 
perfected, they can also be expected to bring organizational changes, a trend that is already well established. 
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Limitations on size can also be necessary to keep the level of transaction costs (Figure 1) 
within bounds.   But, as has already been noted, some of the most often cited types of 
transaction costs are more accurately regarded as production costs.  In real markets certain 
kinds of behavior that generate transaction costs are necessary because, in their absence, there 
can be no transactions (Campbell and Harris, 1993; Macneil, 1981 and 1982).  These costs 
result from what Nooteboom (2002) calls “enabling constraints”.  As Campbell and Harris 
(1993, 178) put it, 
The negotiating, information gathering, organizing, and so on within which 
transactions take place are not only costs, they are also the social relations which are 
essentially facilitative of the transaction.  All actions, including all transactions, can 
take place only within a constitutive social system.  If one really took away all the 
costs of exchanging, the exchange would not take place cost-free.  It simply would not 
take place at all (emphases in original). 
Macneil (1981, 1022) goes further by contending that, 
Because it is impossible to conduct exchange without transaction costs, and since they 
are variable, they are as much a factor of production as are capital and labor.9 
Together, these comments justify Arrow’s conclusion10 that transaction costs are the “costs of 
running the economic system”.  As all firms in a capitalist economy sooner or later need to 
confront markets, internalizing transactions can only be a postponement of the inevitable.11   
                                                 
9
 Baldwin and Clark have referred to these as “mundane transaction costs”, but their importance is defended in 
Jacobides (2005) and Langlois (forthcoming). 
10
 As quoted in Macneil (1981, 1022). 
11
 Which is not to imply that internalization is useless.  Among other things, it may allow a firm to select which 
markets in which it does business both as a buyer or a seller, permitting it to choose ones in which transaction 
costs are relatively modest (and competitive conditions relatively favorable, as in Porter’s (1980) five forces 
model). 
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As an alternative to internalization of activities, firms may adopt a program of reducing 
transaction costs, for example by encouraging the establishment of several suppliers of a 
particular input to reduce the likelihood of hold-up.  Although neoclassical economists have 
tended to ignore transaction costs, from the point of view of a firm these are not particularly 
mysterious and are more likely to be thought of a normal cost of doing business.  
The correspondence between production and transaction costs is clear for constructed 
markets whose product is transactions.  The managers of these markets have great incentive 
to reduce transaction costs by regulating and monitoring (i.e. managing) both ex ante and ex 
post activity.  As far as possible, they need to reduce the impact of bounded rationality in 
order to increase market efficiency, but also to reduce opportunistic activity and to limit risk 
and curtail the effects of uncertainty as markets will not function adequately if the risk of 
default is excessive.12   
In the past quarter century, opportunism has occupied a central place in discussions of 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985).  Because of asymmetric distributions of knowledge, 
some market participants may be able to turn transactions to their advantage if they are 
willing to engage in “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1993, 458).  One way of 
dealing with this, which is emphasized by Williamson (1975 and 1985), is to withdraw from 
markets and keep activities in-house where they can be supervised more closely, but in other 
cases it is possible to reduce opportunism to levels that still allow transactions to take place 
profitably.13   As eliminating transaction costs also incurs costs (Langlois, forthcoming), it is 
again necessary to find the best balance of total costs. 
                                                 
12
 Better flows of knowledge and information can provide both ex ante and ex post remedies to opportunism, but 
other ex ante controls may also be valuable in eliminating opportunism and thus reducing the need for, and the 
costs of, monitoring transactions (Lindenberg, 2000).  
13
 That is, to a level at which transaction costs are smaller than the gains that arise from using markets rather 
than alternative arrangements. 
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One way of reducing opportunism is to deal only with people who are regarded as unlikely to 
act with guile.  Unfortunately, such people are not always easy to identify, especially since 
past behavior, even if known, may not be a good indicator of future behavior, which is what 
parties to a transaction really need to know.  Two broad strategies, neither of which is fool-
proof, can be followed in attempts to avoid having to do business with bad trading partners.  
The first is to achieve an alignment of interests such that non-opportunistic behavior by both 
parties will lead to win-win outcomes while opportunism on the part of either party generates 
lose-lose outcomes.  Transaction costs are therefore reduced since all participants know that 
both they and other parties will avoid opportunistic activities for fear of being penalized 
while non-opportunistic behavior leads to rewards all round.  An alignment of interests can 
be achieved in a number of ways, including the use of formal or informal contracts that 
specify performance levels and their associated positive and negative payoffs.  
As contracts can be expensive to draw up and enforce, however, other means of aligning 
interests may be superior.  One alternative means is to deal as far as possible with others 
whose success is to some extent directly related to one’s own, for example family members.  
When a substantial proportion of assets is held jointly, it is in the interests of each party that 
others should thrive.14  But reliance on relatives can be excessively confining.  Not only is 
there no guarantee that a relative with the proper assets can be found to take the other side of 
a transaction, but, no matter how well aligned their interests, family members may not be as 
skilled or intelligent as outsiders, and the sum of a family’s assets may be inadequate for 
some deals.15   
                                                 
14
 Many of the same attributes are relevant in determining patterns of organization in family firms (Colli, 2003), 
but business relationships among relatives can also be established on an ad hoc basis. 
15
 Moreover, as Lindenberg (2000) points out, emotional blackmail and other tactics can lead to profits and 
losses being distributed in ways that do not correspond to the original amounts contributed or to the distributions 
that would be expected when dealing with outsiders. 
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As a result, other sorting devices may be needed to reduce the risk of opportunism.  This 
brings up questions of trust, an issue that has received uneven attention.  Ordinary usage 
suggests that “trust” comes in a number of varieties and degrees of strength.  Thus we might 
trust someone with our lives whom we would not trust to make a good cup of coffee.  
Williamson (1993) has introduced another criterion by claiming that trust should not be 
calculative but rather equated with “blind trust”, that is with believing that another person 
will behave in our best interests solely on the basic of some heuristic (motherly love, perhaps) 
rather than from a strict and thorough examination of the person’s background, capabilities, 
or other characteristics that are relevant to their motives and ultimate performance.  Once we 
exhibit calculativeness by consciously weighing up the factors involved in another’s 
performance and assessing the risks involved in a relationship, Williamson claims that trust is 
no longer involved.16   Other commentators (Nooteboom, 2000 and 2002; Lindenberg, 2000) 
have contested Williamson’s argument and considerably illuminated the issues in question.  
Here, I accept the thrust of Williamson’s point that calculativeness is often involved in 
assessing relationships with others but deny that this undermines trust as a way of reducing 
transaction costs.  Indeed, Williamson’s claim sidesteps the main point, which is to determine 
how information can be used to reduce transaction costs.  Seabright (2004, 64) captures the 
right tone when he claims that, 
when I say I can trust a stranger, I do not mean that I like him, have any curiosity 
about him as a person, or care in any deep sense about what happens to him.   
The point is that I do not need to like or care about him in order to be able to deal 
confidently and reliably with him.17 
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 At this point, Williamson’s argument reduces to a semantic quibble.  Some people might prefer, for example, 
to say that blind trust is not trust at all but “faith”.   
17
 This view of trust closely parallels Weber’s formulation of the sort of social action that takes place when 
transacting in a market environment (Swedberg, 2000). 
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Naturally, if we know that people with whom we want to do business will not cheat us 
because they are pure of heart, then transaction costs will be reduced because there is no 
longer a risk of opportunism.18  But how can we confidently decide if a person can be dealt 
with reliably?  A number of techniques may be used, although none totally eliminates risk in 
the face of inherent uncertainty. 
A useful way of proceeding, which is known in many societies,19 may be to deal as far as 
possible with the members of one’s peer groups, for instance with people from the same 
locality, school or regiment.  This is a way of economizing on information in selecting 
colleagues and trading partners as well as of reducing the incidence of opportunism.  Bad 
hats, as well as people who succumb to short-term temptation, can be found everywhere, but 
they may be easier to identify among a group whom the selector is already familiar with and 
whose mores she understands.  Furthermore, Lindenberg (2000) argues that allegiance to a 
group leads to greater stability of normative frames in which people are eager to “act 
appropriately” or “to do the right thing” than is likely to occur in dyadic relationships.  In the 
case of a constructed market, the behavior of participants may be constrained by membership 
in two groups, the larger social category from which they are drawn and their immediate 
colleagues in the market itself.  Whether from sensibility or fear of sanctions, parties to a 
transaction within a well-defined and easily monitored group are likely to be reluctant to “let 
the side down” as well as to shame themselves. 
Contracts may not be necessary when a clan can be constructed.  Ouchi (1980, 132), 
following Durkheim’s concept of an organic association, defines a clan something “which 
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 As there are other types of transaction costs than opportunism (Figure 1), it would still not be costless to use 
markets.  Still, if we somehow know who is and is not well disposed towards us and can identify who is likely to 
pose a threat, this would not only reduce the probable loss that might arise directly from being cheated but also 
the costs associated with monitoring for opportunism and perhaps some of the costs involving in checking out 
potential colleagues before entering into a transaction. 
19
 For China, see Redding’s work (1990).  Lie (1998) claims that South Korea has been aiming for national 
homogenization but this has not totally discouraged reliance on peer groups at more micro levels.  See also 
Ungson, et al. (1997). 
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resembles a kin network but may not only include blood relations.”20  As a result of 
socialization to common norms, the members of a clan share values and beliefs as well as 
views on reciprocity and legitimate authority.  Although Ouchi (1980) is referring primarily 
to employees of an single organization, the same set of characteristics are needed in 
constructed markets in which the members compete but are able to gain efficiency through an 
acceptance of common goals and procedures that reduces, but cannot completely remove, the 
need for monitoring. 
Opportunism is not the only reason for choosing trading partners with great care.  
Unpredictable shocks can cause disaster in a world of uncertainty, even shocks that apply 
only indirectly to an associate.  When there is unlimited liability for debts – which was the 
norm when many markets were constructed and still applies to transactions in many financial 
markets21 – a  person can be forced to pay debts that might more appropriately be assigned to 
his partners.  Thus there is a potential for asymmetry in returns as an investor can bear risk 
for his partners without being entitled to share fully in their gains.  Following recent disasters, 
the ability of Lloyd’s syndicates (of which there are presently 63) to vet the finances of their 
participating Names has kept claims from becoming the responsibility of only a few of the 
more solvent Names and assured that the claims would be paid by the syndicates as originally 
contracted.   This has caused extreme discomfort for some of the less wealthy Names but has 
also confined the damage within Lloyd’s and ensured that it could continue to issue policies. 
The pitfalls of partnerships with unlimited liability extend even further. When a risk may 
arise not just from the indiscretions or misjudgments of a partner but from those of that 
person’s other partners, a default can lead to a disaster spreading several removes from its 
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 Ouchi (1984, 25) contends that a clan involves “the permanence of a blood relation between fellow employees 
… A clan is an organization in which the members are bound together over a very long run.”  He acknowledges, 
however, that “even familiar clans are rife with conflict and disagreement …”. 
21
 More recently, firms operating in a market may still have unlimited liability for debts even though they are 
incorporated and the debt of their owners is limited.  Managers are understandably reluctant to allow their firms 
to go bankrupt despite the boundaries on damage suffered by the firms’ owners. 
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origins.  This again supports restricting the operations of a market to people from a group that 
can be easily monitored as it is necessary to collect information that extends beyond things 
that, at first glance, seem directly relevant to potential participants in the market. 
The benefits of self-regulation in constructed markets are therefore manifold.  Constructed 
markets can decide their scope of activities in order to achieve appropriate levels of 
specialization. Within the normal meaning of production costs, these markets are able to 
control their own venues and some proportion of their personnel and capital.  They are also 
able to regulate to ensure that their markets are relatively efficient and transparent by placing 
controls on the number of participants.  Most importantly, because they can control the 
number of participants, they can also scrutinize their charcteristics and monitor their activities 
(Lindenberg, 2000) relatively cheaply.  As a result, constructed markets are able to deal with 
substantial levels of opportunism and risk without impairing their ability to function 
efficiently. 
3. Stock Exchanges as Constructed Markets 
The operations of constructed markets can be illustrated by examining aspects of the history 
of the two most important stock exchanges, in London and New York and then comparing 
these with development of the Sydney Stock Exchange.22  While their stories run parallel in 
many respects, they also show the effects of local environments on institutional development. 
Institutional economists and economic historians have already charted the contingent nature 
of the establishment and increasing sophistication of markets over the past thousand years 
and they have also examined self-regulation as a device for reducing transaction costs as far 
back as the Middle Ages (North, 2005; Greif, 2006; Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990; 
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 For more complete accounts of the development of the London and New York Stock Exchanges, see Michie 
(1987, 1988, and 1999), Morgan and Thomas (1962), Sobel (1964), and Geisst (2004).  These exchanges did not 
provide the only model for development.  As Weber (2000 [1894]) discusses, their high degree of self-
regulation contrasted sharply with the greater degree of government regulation common on the Continent.  
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Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994).  The evolution of stock exchanges provides a different 
perspective, however, because of their role in developing modern institutions and their 
continuing importance.   They therefore offer a good set of examples of how specialized 
markets have been consciously constructed over an extended period on a trial-and-error basis 
in order to cope with changing circumstances.  This can be demonstrated by examining the 
early development of the London (LSE), New York (NYSE), and Sydney (SSE) Stock 
Exchanges. 
Technically, both the LSE and NYSE date from the early years of the nineteenth century.  
Both were built on earlier institutional structures, however, and in the case of the LSE the 
history of the marketing of securities already dated back more than a century and had 
achieved considerable technical sophistication before the Stock Exchange was formally set 
up.  According to Morgan and Thomas (1962, 11), 
There are several conditions that must be fulfilled before a specialist group of dealers 
in stocks and shares can arise.  Before there can be the makings of a regular market 
there must obviously be a considerable volume of securities, the ownership of which 
is fairly widely distributed; there must be a sufficient number of wealthy men and 
women who wish to hold some of their possessions in financial assets rather than in 
business or real property; the development of the market will also be greatly assisted 
if the law recognises simple procedures for the transfer of titles; if shares are of 
convenient and fairly small denominations, and if there is a banking system to provide 
a simple means of payment.  All these conditions had been fulfilled in England by the 
end of the seventeenth century. 
Throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a growing market for securities 
(principally to cover the national debt) and a smaller market for shares in joint-stock 
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companies led to a variety of trading arrangements.  Originally, brokers and jobbers met 
alongside others in the Royal Exchange which, like the brokers themselves, was not highly 
specialized.  Before they left for other venues in 1696, “dealers in stocks and shares … had a 
‘walk’ near the centre of the building between the salters, the Italian merchants and the 
Canary merchants” (Morgan and Thomas, 1962, 27).  Subsequently, the dealers met in 
neighboring streets and coffee houses, and in the Rotunda of the Bank of England until they 
were effectively evicted in the 1830s (Michie, 1999).   
Although a privately-owned building called the Stock Exchange was a major site for trading 
from 1773, the foundation of the London Stock Exchange as an institution is usually regarded 
as having occurred in 1801, when access to a new building was limited to members who paid 
a subscription fee, creating a closed market in the midst of the otherwise open London 
securities market.  Even then, however, the LSE did not take over the securities market, even 
in the capital.  What it did do was to institute a system under which a self-selected group of 
brokers could regulate the way in which they engaged in trade.  Michie therefore 
distinguishes between a securities market and a stock exchange by defining the latter as “A 
market where specialized intermediaries buy and sell securities under a common set of rules 
and regulations through a closed system dedicated to that purpose” (1999, 3).  Thus while the 
LSE did not succeed in taking over the entire securities market, it did impose a framework in 
which the members were able to reduce the amount of risk that they faced in comparison to 
outsiders who also dealt in securities.23 
The establishment of the NYSE followed a similar path, although in a less developed setting.  
Moreover, New York’s place as the financial heart of the United States was not fully 
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 Weber (2000 [1894]) distinguishes an exchange from a market on the grounds that its participants are traders 
acting as agents rather than members of the general public.  He argues that the advantage that separates these 
traders from other who, in the absence of regulation, might try to deal directly in a particular security or 
commodity is that the professional traders have superior specialized knowledge that they are willing to share 
with others for a relatively modest fee. 
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established until after the NYSE had been operating for a number of years.  Before then, 
Philadelphia was the dominant center.  As in London, dealing in securities in New York was 
decentralized and uncontrolled until the last years of the eighteenth century.  Brokers met in 
coffee houses in the vicinity of Wall Street in Lower Manhattan until 1792 when a 
specialized meeting place, the Tontine Coffee-House24 was built at the corner of Wall and 
Water Streets (across from Alexander Hamilton’s house).  By then, in May 1792, a group of 
brokers had already agreed to regulate commissions (Sobel, 1965). 
The owners of the Tontine were not specialist brokers but businessmen for whom securities 
were a minor interest.   The establishment of the NYSE came in 1817 when the New York 
Stock and Exchange Board was set up following a visit by New York brokers to examine the 
operations of their rivals in Philadelphia (Sobel, 1965; Geisst, 2004).  Like the LSE, the 
Stock and Exchange Board and its successor, the NYSE, had a constitution that specified who 
was eligible to be a member and regulated their conduct. 
The main reason for establishing the two Stock Exchanges was not to protect the public but to 
protect the members against problems caused by other brokers.  In some cases, opportunism 
was the target, but the rules also attempted to reduce risk.  In the process, over a long period, 
both exchanges moved closer to what would today be considered “efficient” markets because 
they facilitated a more open distribution of knowledge among brokers. 
Both markets relied on their members to be able and willing to settle their debts in full and on 
time.  Time considerations were especially important in the case of the LSE because 
settlement was often weeks after transactions occurred, in contrast to the NYSE which 
insisted on settlement the following day to avoid any suggestion of gambling (Michie, 1987 
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 “Tontine” was a reasonable name for the site of a securities market.  Until the nineteenth century, shares in 
financial schemes such as lotteries and tontines were traded as securities, and lotteries were among the 
sweeteners that the British government used to induce people to finance the national debt (Morgan and Thomas, 
1962). 
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and 1988).  As commissions were a fraction of one per cent of the value of trades, the sums 
involved could be enormous relative to the capital of the brokers.  Guarantees that members 
deposited with the LSE (£250 until 1832 when they were increased to £300) were tiny in 
comparison to the amounts that could be lost.  When Thomas Manson failed in 1814, for 
example, he had outstanding commitments to fellow members of £134,000 while J. and L. 
Burnand owed £437,000 when they went bankrupt in 1835 (Michie, 1999).  On the other side 
of the Atlantic, before the NYSE was founded, the 1792 bankruptcy of William Duer, a 
friend and associate of Hamilton, led to a decline in securities transactions that lasted for 
several years (Sobel, 1965). Even eighty years later, the entire operations of the NYSE 
collapsed with the failure of Jay Cooke and Co. in 1873 (Geisst, 2004).  It is hardly surprising 
that a major thrust of the regulations of both exchanges was the recruitment of sound 
members and the implementation of mechanisms to monitor their subsequent activities. 
In Britain, the LSE formed a part of what Cain and Hopkins (2001) have called “gentlemanly 
capitalism”, a regime under which people of substance and sound reputation tried to restrict 
their business operations to others of similar background.  In overseas trade, shipping, and 
insurance, as well as in securities markets, education, family, marriage and other 
characteristics came to be used as sorting devices.  They were not, of course, the sole 
indicators of probity (at least among sensible people) as shady personal behavior could 
override background and lead to exclusion from trade with people who were both cautious 
and of substance.  Similarly, the NYSE tried to restrict its membership to people of honesty 
and means, although perhaps with less success than the LSE (or some other American 
exchanges such as Boston) were able to command (Geisst, 2004). 
The membership policies of the two exchanges, although directed toward the same end, 
differed considerably.  Until shortly before the First World War, the London Stock exchange 
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did not attempt to restrict the number of members but concentrated instead on the 
characteristics of the members and imposed strict controls on their activities to reduce risk to 
other members.  Membership was generally open to qualified brokers or jobbers and the costs 
of admission were relatively cheap (around £1200 in 1904, or £440 for a stockbroker’s clerk).  
As a result, membership rose from 864 in 1850 to 5,567 in 1905 (Michie, 1987).25  But 
because the required personal wealth was small, the LSE carefully restricted the activities of 
its members:  All partners in a firm had to be members and members were barred from 
outside activities including banking and the law.  There were two main reasons for this.  First, 
it was easier to monitor members who were not allowed to take part in other businesses.  
Equally important was that the policy reduced the exposure of members of the exchange to 
misfortunes that befell non-members, a matter of great importance before limited liability 
became common and partners were liable not only for their own debts but for those of their 
partners.  To reduce the chance of ripple effects arising not from opportunistic or imprudent 
behavior by members but from problems that might literally arise anywhere in the world, the 
LSE simply forbade its members from becoming involved in other businesses (Michie, 1987 
and 1999). 
The New York Stock Exchange, by contrast, was far less open to accepting new members in 
later years.  The original initiation fee was a very modest $25, although undesirable 
applicants could be, and were, blackballed.  In the 1840s, this was raised to $400 in the hope 
of eliminating poorer applicants and from 1869 the number of seats was effectively frozen.26  
From this time onwards, seats could be bought or sold and prices soon rose, reaching between 
$64,000 and $94,000 (£13,000-£18,800) in 1910.  As a result, members of the NYSE were in 
general wealthier than those of the LSE.  This was magnified by the fact that holders of seats 
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 Before declining to 4,855 in 1914 (Michie, 1987). 
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 After merging with the Open Board in 1869, the NYSE had 1,060 members, a number that had increased by 
only 40 in 1914 (Sobel, 1965; Michie, 1987). 
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in New York could engage in a wider range of business and generally formed more highly 
capitalized firms that were better able to withstand shocks (Geisst, 2004; Michie, 1987).  
Finally, the earlier availability of general limited liability in parts of the United States 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003) may have reduced concerns over conducting business 
with outsiders. 
The purpose of these rules was not to establish monopolies.27  In fact, they probably had the 
opposite effect by generating membership barriers that were hard to surmount at a time when 
there were few in any government restrictions on trading securities in Britain or the United 
States to deter outsiders from establishing competing markets. As a result, neither the London 
nor the New York Stock Exchange controlled trading in securities in their home markets.  
Both countries had regional exchanges as well as brokers who acted independently.  In 
addition, the NYSE had two large competitors in New York itself, the Consolidated Stock 
Exchange and the Curb Exchange.  By 1913, the NYSE had 1100 traders but the 
Consolidated had 1,225 and there were at least 200 members of the Curb Exchange (Michie, 
1987; Sobel, 1970).  Instead, the LSE and the NYSE were designed (a word used advisedly) 
to protect their members by regulating and monitoring their actions.  In the process of 
reducing opportunism and risk, they also moved by stages towards the creation of what 
would now be known as more “efficient” markets.  That is, through conscious rule-making, 
they were able to reduce transaction costs to manageable levels.  They therefore not only 
illustrate the value of transaction costs (in this case the compliance costs of conforming to 
rules intended to mitigate the effects of opportunism and risk) in lubricating a market but also 
demonstrate how constructed markets can, under suitable circumstances, be alternatives to 
both unstructured markets and hierarchies. 
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 For example, in its early years, the London Stock Exchange explicitly declined to deal in foreign securities.  
These continued to be traded at the Royal Exchange until a Foreign Stock Exchange was founded in the early 
1820s.  This was then absorbed shortly afterwards into the LSE (Morgan and Thomas, 1962; Smith, 2003). 
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The history of the Sydney Stock Exchange, which was apparently founded in May, 1871 
(Salsbury and Sweeney, 1988), gives additional insight into the ways in which different 
environments can affect the management of markets.  Although the founders of the exchange 
shared the legal heritage and economic views of their American and, particularly, British 
counterparts, the SSE differed in that Australia offered thinner and perhaps more fragmented 
markets than prevailed in larger countries.  Equally importantly, while the rules and practices 
of the London and New York Stock Exchanges were originally rudimentary and evolved 
through trial and error as their home economies became more complex in the nineteenth 
century, the founders and members of the Executive Committee of the SSE were able to build 
on the earlier experiences of exchanges overseas that provided templates for the modeling of 
their own regulations.  Consequently, the SSE eventually adopted a set of rules that mirrored 
London in paying more attention to the attraction of members with suitable characteristics 
than to capping numbers, but that followed the NYSE by creating a seat system. 
Salsbury and Sweeney (1988, 251) contend that “For [the leaders of the SSE] the Stock 
Exchange was not a corporation, but an association of gentlemen bound together by integrity 
of character and mutual trust.”  This is unquestionably true, but (for better or for worse) the 
SSE was nevertheless a carefully-managed and rule-driven organization. 
The rules governing membership of the SSE varied with economic conditions, with the 
qualifications and fees required of new members rising and falling regularly between 1871 
and 1940.28  The initial set of Rules and Regulations in 1872 provided that members were to 
be elected by a majority vote of a quorum of the Exchange’s standing committee but no 
mention was made of the requirements to be a member beyond the payment of a five guinea29 
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of the Sydney Stock Exchange that are held in the archives of the Australian Stock Exchange.  I am grateful to 
Ms. Pam Spies, the Archives and Records Manager of the ASX, for her help and advice. 
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 A guinea was 21 shillings, or ₤1.05. 
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entrance fee.  As there were no annual fees at the time, the formal qualifications were quite 
loose, although the membership applications of people known to have unspecified 
undesirable characteristics were no doubt expected to be vetoed by the standing committee. 
By 1875, an annual fee of two guineas had been instituted and Rule I now provided that, 
“The Members of the Sydney Stock Exchange shall consist of Brokers engaged 
[extensively]30 in the purchase and sale of Shares, Debentures, Exchanges, Mines and Mining 
Interests and in the negotiation of other monetary transactions.”  Rule X of the 1875 Rules 
and Regulations followed the LSE by providing that all partners of a firm of brokers had to 
be members of the SSE if any were, and laying down that if one partner were excluded a new 
firm of brokers would have to be formed without the offending man if the other partners were 
to become members of the Exchange.   
The 1880s, a relatively buoyant period, saw a tightening of membership rules.  In the 1881 
Rules and Regulations, “extensively” was changed to “exclusively” in Rule 1, prohibiting 
members of the SSE from engaging in any other businesses.  As a result, the Exchange 
became a closed body that, in theory, should have been insulated from financial problems 
faced by non-members.31  As a strategic move, in 1887 members of the SSE were prohibited 
from being members of “any other exchange in Sydney engaged in the same business” (Rules 
of the Sydney Stock Exchange, 1887, Rule I).  At the same time, a new rule was introduced to 
free the Exchange from the taint of bankruptcy.  This tightening was made possible by a 
growth in the number of potential members during the decade – 31 new members were 
admitted in the 1880s in contrast to the two new members who joined between 1875 and 
1879 (Salsbury and Sweeney, 1988 and 1992).  Further tightening resulted from fee increases 
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 The word “extensively” was not in the original 1875 printed rules but was inserted sometime between then 
and 1881. 
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 Although misfortunes of close members of the families of brokers could still have been disruptive. 
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during the decade, as entrance fees rose from five guineas to ₤1,000 in the course of the 
decade and annual fees rose from two to 15 guineas.  Rapid increases in entrance fees was 
accompanied by the introduction of a seat system that allowed members to sell their 
memberships if they retired honorably. It is clear that these new measures were facilitated by 
the Broken Hill boom of the later part of the decade, with 18 of the new members joining 
between 1887 and 1889 (Salsbury and Sweeney, 1988).32 
Membership rules were loosened again in the relatively depressed years of the 1890s.  1n 
1890, before the full impact of the depression following the Broken Hill boom was known, 
the Exchange proposed to limit the number of members to 50.  In the event, the limit was 
unnecessary and was never activated.  Although the entrance fee was ₤1,000 from the end of 
1889, because of the crash members were unable to sell their seats at the full price.  In March, 
1892, one of the original members of the exchange received only ₤300 for his seat when he 
retired.  According to a handwritten note in the Exchange’s copy of the Rules, as late as 
September, 1904 the entrance fee was reduced to ₤600 until five new members had been 
elected.33  Even though 52 new members were admitted between 1890 and 1910, the price at 
which seats changed hands did not reach its nominal value of ₤1,000 again until the latter 
year (Salsbury and Sweeney, 1988).  In addition, rules concerning bankruptcy and default 
among members were loosened in the course of the 1890s. 
Despite the devaluation of seats, in 1896 the SSE actually expanded the numbers allowed to 
trade by creating a new category of “authorised dealer”.  This coincided with a move to new 
premises with a large ground floor “vestibule” below the trading room.  The authorised 
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  It is less clear that the stricter requirements were very effective in producing a better quality of member.  Ten 
of the 33 members who joined between 1875 and 1889 were either expelled subsequently or allowed to resign 
because they had defaulted in business with other members of the SSE (Salsbury and Sweeney, 1988 and 1992). 
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 The handwritten note, opposite p. 9 of the ASX copy, reads, “Rule 31 30/9/04 amount of Entrance fee 
suspended until 5 new M’bers have been elected at a fee of ₤600 under such Rule.”  Rules of the Sydney Stock 
Exchange Adopted 9th May, 1904, with Additions & Amendments to 10th June, 1904. 
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dealers were not allowed to visit the trading floor or to deal with customers on the premises, 
but they could trade with members and with each other in the vestibule.  Originally the 
authorised dealers paid ₤15 each per annum (Salsbury and Sweeney, 1984), but in 1899 an 
entrance fee of 50 guineas was instituted along with an annual charge of 25 guineas.  Thus 
the SSE may have viewed authorised dealers as a source of additional income at a time when 
its commission for selling seats had eroded. 
The interwar years brought further changes in membership rules.  By 1921, the Exchange had 
determined that the entrance fee would rise from ₤1,000 to ₤1,500 as soon as membership 
reached 72,34 but eventually rescinded the decision.  Entrance fees continued to rise 
throughout the period, however, reaching ₤2,000 in October, 1927, ₤2,500 in October, 1929 
(two weeks before the NYSE’s “Black Thursday”), ₤3,000 in June, 1933, ₤4,000 in January, 
1935, and ₤5,000 in November, 1936.  The motivation behind these increases – at a time 
when the Australian economy was performing poorly – is unclear, but they probably 
represented attempts to make an intimate institution even more close knit.35  As early as 
1920, the category of authorised dealer had been abolished, perhaps because almost all 
brokers in Sydney at that time were already members of the SSE (Salsbury and Sweeney, 
1988).  
The new restrictions on membership probably were more an example of the poor use of a 
strategic tool than a response to opportunism or other transaction cost considerations. As 
Carlton (1984) and Geroski (1998) have suggested, constructed exchanges with centralized 
management are well equipped to move strategically.  Michie (1987, 1999), for instance, 
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 Rules of the Sydney Stock Exchange, with Additions and Amendments to 16th February, 1921, Rule 31, p. 18.  
The target figure of 72 members indicates how small the SSE was in comparison to exchanges in London and 
New York. 
35
 Because the Entrance Fee was also the benchmark for the price at which seats changed hands, members were 
able to increase their own wealth by manipulating the Entrance Fee – assuming that there was sufficient demand 
for seats. 
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discusses the strategic use of flexible commission fees by the LSE and the problems that 
arose when fixed fees were introduced in 1912.  The primary concern of the SSE was to 
achieve a monopoly of business in Sydney by bringing in measures that unfortunately also 
restricted the Exchange’s ability to deal with competition in other parts of Australia.  As the 
SSE was not in a strong position, these maneuvers backfired.  By 1914, the Stock Exchange 
of Melbourne had overtaken the SSE as Australia’s largest exchange (Salsbury and Sweeney, 
1988). 
Moreover, capital raising in Australia shifted to a new basis in the interwar period, which 
placed greater emphasis than in the past on an ability to raise funds nationally (Salsbury and 
Sweeney, 1988).  Although the SSE was successful in gaining nearly absolute control of 
activities in Sydney, this was achieved in part through policies intended to reduce 
connections between its members and other stock exchanges in New South Wales and 
Australia as a whole.  From 1922, members of the SSE were forbidden to conduct business 
outside the City of Sydney.36  By 1927, the Exchange had also placed restrictions on the 
ability of its members to act as underwriters in collaboration with members of other stock 
exchanges.  Consequently, exchanges in Melbourne and elsewhere were able to scoop up 
business in important country areas, including those in New South Wales, and to cooperate 
on national flotations more easily than members of the SSE could, further undermining 
Sydney’s competitiveness, a state that continued well into the postwar period (Salsbury and 
Sweeney, 1988). 
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 With an area of approximately two square miles, the City of Sydney was a very small part of the Sydney 
region, let alone of New South Wales as a whole.  An exemption was made for the Adelaide firm of S. C. Ward 
& Co. that had long had a partner as a member of the SSE. 
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4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The analysis and case studies presented here demonstrate, firstly, that markets and hierarchies 
are not necessarily alternative forms of organization.  Some of the most important markets 
have been consciously constructed as hierarchies in order to increase their competitive 
strength both locally and internationally.  Although the terms regulation and self-regulation 
have been used in the paper, management better describes the processes examined.  Financial 
markets, such as stock and commodities exchanges, are best thought of enterprises producing 
services in the form of transactions.37  This may be done with varying degrees of efficiency, 
and if efficiency levels are too low, the enterprise is likely to fail.  As recent attempts at 
diversification and merger have shown, these markets are subject to many of the management 
techniques that normally come to mind in relation to other types of firms.  In the cases 
discussed here, the emphasis has been on increasing efficiency through improving knowledge 
flows while simultaneously reducing exposure to opportunism and risk.  This is a common 
program for managers in many industries, but the need to develop coping techniques 
probably arose earliest in financial markets, overseas trade, and similar areas in which the 
connection between communications and opportunism and risk have long been important for 
survival. 
A second major point is that transaction costs are not necessarily frictions or noise and that 
they may contribute substantially to the successful use of markets.  As a concept, this is not 
entirely new (Macneil, 1981; Lindenberg, 2000; Nooteboom, 2002; Jacobides, 2005; 
Langlois, forthcoming), but I have gone further by describing how markets may be 
                                                 
37
 A major difference between the cases discussed here and by MacKenzie and Millo (2003), on the one hand, 
and by Jacobides (2005), on the other, is that the type of outsourcing described by Jacobides has not led in many 
cases to the creation of “manageable” markets, even though the trading undertaken is often subject to external 
regulation.  Michie (2001) and Weber (2000 [1894]) may provide a clue to these differences when they define 
exchanges to involve deals among traders (agents) rather than among producers and final customers.  It will be 
interesting to see if new communications methods change this is the case of mortgage brokers, for example, who 
need to maintain close contact with customers in highly diverse circumstances. 
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specifically designed, not only to reduce transaction costs, but to improve their economic 
efficiency at the same time.  This is possible because for markets (in contrast to the goods or 
services traded in markets), what outsiders may perceive as transaction costs are frequently 
also production costs.  As a result, it is sometimes possible for the people who control 
markets to reduce the transaction costs of their users in the process of reducing their 
production costs. Not all markets are amenable to this type of treatment because many are too 
decentralized and approximate Salter’s description of a “system [that] works itself” (or Adam 
Smith’s Invisible Hand).  In some cases, however, including important financial and 
commodity markets, it has been possible to improve consciously on trading systems that have 
evolved naturally. 
Several lessons can be derived from the story told here.  The first concerns transaction cost 
analysis and the relationship between transaction costs and production costs.  Regardless of 
whether one accepts the use of the word “trust” to describe calculative behavior, it is clear 
that people have frequently consciously manipulated their environments to reduce the 
probable effects arising from opportunism.  In addition to hierarchies and to markets as 
conventionally understood, it is possible to construct markets that are as efficient as, or more 
efficient than, markets that have evolved organically.  This can be – and in important cases, 
has been – done through either cooperation or fiat.38  This implies that economists could 
profit from a deeper study of the ability of a wide range of institutional arrangements to 
attenuate transaction costs.  Even though there are costs involved in setting up new types of 
institutions, this is not relevant as long as the resulting savings are larger.  Thus further 
research should extend beyond exchanges to look at arrangements between other 
                                                 
38
 In nineteenth century France, Germany, and Austria, for example, the membership and rules of stock 
exchanges were established by government regulation rather than privately as in English-speaking countries 
(Weber, 2000 [1894]).  Whether these institutions were as well run as in Britain or the USA is a matter of 
dispute (Weber preferred the English model), but they did permit the establishment of markets of sufficient 
efficiency to allow widespread trade in government securities and private shares. 
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configurations of buyers and sellers (e.g. real estate markets and electronic auctions) as well 
as along supply chains (as Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005) have recently begun to explore). 
The relationship between transaction costs and classical costs of production also deserves 
more thought than it has received to date.  It is clear that some of the most important classes 
of transaction costs have had implications for production costs that go beyond simple make-
buy decisions.  For instance, the potential for hold-up is not only a possible transaction cost 
but may affect the choice of a production function.  When hold-up is likely, therefore, it 
should be included in discussions of production costs as well as of opportunism.  This 
blurring between production and transaction costs extends, as here, into other parts of the 
economy – in fact, into any activity in which the conduct of transactions is a major aspect of 
a firm’s business.  Defined in this way, transaction costs as production costs affect significant 
sectors of modern economies, both for specialist traders and for firms such as McDonalds for 
whom the production and the sale of a good or service are closely related. 
Finally, because of their ability to maneuver strategically, the possibility of managing 
markets not only affects their operations and the welfare of their members but also the 
welfare of other firms, national economies, and even the world economy.  Although the cases 
cited are historical, these considerations have become increasingly important in recent years 
as a result improved communications and the partial abandonment of a number of barriers to 
trade in general and capital flows in particular.  The way in which these markets are 
administered and their strategic activities are therefore important to policy makers and to the 
public at large. 
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